At the onset of the UN climate management process the working rationale to determine the fair share of emission reduction was for developed economies to shoulder the burden of reduction with developing economies not having emissions restricted, the argument being that developing countries’ economic development should not be penalised by emission constraints. Today, with economic growth in developed economies mostly lagging the continuing economic expansion in developing economies, the question increasingly being asked is ‘can developed economies afford decarbonisation or net zero?’
Most countries, including developing economies, have set out a net zero and/or sectoral decarbonisation targets. Indeed, it has become a matter of national pride to set an early net zero target with the race on to be the first to achieve the climate holy grail of zero emissions. And, if these targets are met most of the global economy will be net carbon zero by 2050. But let’s be clear. Net zero does not mean zero emissions, but that emissions produced are netted off by emission reduction and removal. It is of course impossible, given the importance of carbon to manufacturing, and particularly the pharmaceutical industry, and not forgetting the flatulent digestive systems of herbivores, to have a global society that produces zero emissions.
“The fundamental problem with net zero is that it will not prevent climate change.”
The fundamental problem with net zero is that it will not prevent climate change. According to the latest science, the global temperature increase that will make climate change irreversible could be met before the end of this decade. In June the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) predicted the temperature for each year between 2024 and 2028 to be between 1.1°C and 1.9°C higher than the 1850-1900 baseline, and that it is likely (86%) that at least one of these years will set a new temperature record, beating 2023 which is currently the warmest year. The WMO also said there is a 47% likelihood that the global temperature averaged over the entire five-year 2024-2028 period will exceed by 1.5 °C that of the pre-industrial era, up from 32% in its previous forecast for the 2023-2027 period.
If we accept the science that claims warming of more than 1.5°C risks unleashing far more severe climate change impacts and extreme weather, and the forecasts that this warming will be realised this decade, then surely the focus has to shift from climate mitigation to adaptation.
Of course, reducing emissions is important to improve air quality but the UK, for example, seeking to decarbonise the power sector by 2030 and achieve net zero by 2050 will have little to no impact on global warming. The UK emits just under 1% of global emissions and reducing this to zero will have no material impact on global warming. In the emissions league table China is top with 35%, followed by the USA with 13%, India 7% and Russia 5%. And while the USA seeks net zero by 2050 in line with the UK and EU, China has set a target of 2060 and India 2070. Cognisant of these emission facts, a UK 2050 net zero target will not affect global warming.
The recently elected Labour government has prioritised decarbonisation of the energy sector, claiming it would reduce energy costs, improve supply security and of course help mitigate climate change. In less than two months in office, the government has repealed the effective ban on onshore wind, committed to ending North Sea oil and gas exploration, has overturned a previous objection to two large solar plants on farmland, and plans to legislate for a GB Energy company that will develop renewable energy and will be capitalised by a deeper windfall tax on oil and gas companies.
The government claims that displacing fossil fuel (mostly gas) production by renewables will lower energy costs and improve security by not being reliant on Russia for gas; not that the UK was ever reliant on Russia. While a larger share of renewable production will lower wholesale power costs it will not necessarily reduce actual power tariffs. In 2023, energy supply (wholesale cost) accounted for 54% of the average non-household UK power tariff with network costs accounting for 16% and the balance (30%) attributed to climate, emission and renewable support costs.
Accelerating investment in renewable energy, which will be necessary to achieve power sector decarbonisation five years earlier by 2030, will require investment in new transmission capacity to accommodate the new renewable (mostly wind) capacity and to mitigate curtailment costs, and will necessitate higher subsidy incentives to attract the renewable developers. These costs will be have to be recovered in tariffs, so while energy costs will reduce as the renewable share increases the non-energy costs in the tariff will increase. The net effect will be at best stable tariffs if energy cost reductions offset non-energy cost increases although it is far more likely that actual tariffs will increase in the medium-term.
Not only will net zero fail the energy affordability test, is also likely to challenge the security test.
Not only will net zero fail the energy affordability test it is also likely to challenge the security test. Supply security is best achieved by supply diversity. Increasing reliance on renewable energy and removing gas reduces this diversity. Currently the share of wind production in UK supply typically ranges between 10% and 35%, although it has been as low as 3% and as high as 51%, with nuclear providing around 15%, imports 15%, biomass 5%, hydro 2%, and gas providing the balance and contingent on the wind share.
Clearly, even if wind capacity is tripled, if the wind is not blowing there will be a supply risk without baseload backup, which adds additional costs with backup plant being paid to fire up when winds are forecast to fall.
And then there is sustainability, the third element of the energy trilemma. While renewable energy is sustainable it can impose an indirect cost on eco-sustainability. Consider the government’s decision to approved large solar projects on farmland. What is the cost to food production and is it less sustainable as a result? The same argument applies to the production of biofuels – what is more important, using agriculture for food, or for energy?
The UK’s obsession with fast tracking net zero will not help prevent worsening global climate change and will likely increase the risk of energy supply insecurity, reduce energy affordability and risk endangering eco-sustainability
Jeremy Wilcox is managing director of the Energy Partnership, an independent Thailand-based energy and environment consulting firm
